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[START OF TRANSCRIPT]
[0:00:08] Edward:

Okay, my name is Edward Nossen and I came to RCA in 1955. I was offered
two positions; one in Camden and one in Moorestown. Moorestown at that
time was air-conditioned, Camden was not. That was the decision maker.
But I worked for the airborne systems division, which was located in
Moorestown at the time. I started reading about air defense fire control. I’ve
come from a non-military background, so this was all new to me. Looked at
the Falcon missile system and how it was implemented that the missile
auxiliaries and came up with a solution to greatly simplify the number of
boxes by time sharing the checkout of the missiles didn’t need to them all
simultaneously. Generally they weren’t shot off simultaneously. Then I was
loaned out to M&SR just down the hall.

[0:01:53]

They had a problem with the Talos land-base system; in particular, the
missile guidance radar. The problem was with the ConScan notation servo. It
wasn’t working too well and didn’t work at all at -40 degrees. While I was
getting into the servo business, I was taking a course of Drexel as part of my
Master’s program in servo theory. So I started to look at the servo and it
seemed to work all right a normal operating temperature. But it didn’t work
at all at low temperature. The shaft just froze. After checking everything
out, I realized that the speed control used the field control, couple of tubes
like 6L6s were driving the field, and when speed was low or it would stop,
field time was reduced and at the same time the torque was reduced, so
there was no way out. Now, I’d spend the summer working for Boggs
Electric and they build motors, generators, combinations. I became familiar
with Ward-Lenno system where you have a generator driving a motor.
Instead of the field, you control the armature from the generator.

[0:04:08]

I suggested that to management and they said, “Nah, we don’t have the
money. We don’t have the time. See if you can fix it without…” I managed to
convince some of the other engineers in the servo group and there was a
spare generator on the large assembly which had generators for the angle
track or something so on, and we jury rigged a Ward-Lenno system and it
worked. Minus 40 degrees it broke loose and started up. Of course once I
gave a demonstration to management, they said “Okay, let’s put manpower
on it and let’s get it done.” We had to deal with the supplier of the
generators and motors, I believe it was Singer, come up with the right specs.
Eventually, that worked out. In the process of fixing the servo system, I
realized that there was jitter in the system because the bandwidth was too
wide so then the signal to noise ratio was low. Reducing the bandwidth fixed
that part but made acquisition much slower.

[0:05:59]

I came up with a very simple concept, change the bandwidth. When the
signal is large, have a wide bandwidth; and when the signal is small, and it
wouldn't improve the signal noise, reduce the bandwidth. All it took was a
capacitor and a Zener diode. Zener diode was the threshold. Once it
exceeded the level of the Zener diode, the capacitor was cut out and now

we had full bandwidth. Then I went back, after that project, I went back to
airborne systems, and we were thrown out by the radar division because
they needed the space. We wound up going back to Camden. I found myself
in a newly organized systems group with one of the activities being ECM and
ECCM. I have no background in that, but I learned on the job or rather
learned on the proposal. The first thing that happened was we got a request
for a proposal to come up with a ECM suite, receivers, jammers, and so on
for the B-70 aircraft.
[0:07:56]

The only activity in RCA that was involved in that kind of technology was on
the west coast, Van Nyes. So I went out there and I believe they may have
been the prime on it but I learned about jammers and supporting receivers,
and so on. We lost the B-70 bid. We just didn’t have the depth of
knowledge. There were other companies that had been in that business for
years. In fact, Sperry was building a large integrated system for the B-52H,
which was then just coming off the assembly line. I decided to take a look at
what they had on the other B-52’s and it was very antiquated. They had as
many as nine tuners, had one display. The operator switched from one tuner
to the next trying to detect a hostile signal and then put a jammer on it if it
was suspect. At the time of the B-52G’s were the latest, they were flying and
had that technology on it.

[0:09:55]

I did some thinking and came up with a concept of having all tuners sweep
simultaneously. It took two seconds to sweep from one end of the band to
the other. I checked out DuMont and what they had in airborne direct-view
storage tubes and I came up with an unsolicited proposal, which was
submitted to the air force for use on the older B-52’s like the G and earlier
ones. We presented the concept and it was filed away. A little bit later, the
B-52H system that was under development, was getting too heavy, too
expensive, and the air force canceled it. Now they had an empty hole in the
B-52H. Then somebody remembered there was this unsolicited proposal
somewhere in their drawer, and they dug it out, we got a call, “Would you
like to come and give a presentation on that?” They also asked a few other
companies if they had any off-the-shelf or near off-the-shelf equipment that
could be used. We won the job and we built a couple hundred systems. I
have the original brochure here, which was classified back then.

[0:12:14]

Counter-measures receiving SEP AN/ALR 19. Block diagram, picture of the
display, and here is the actual display. There were a number of scans going
on simultaneously. All they were doing was scanning. There were two, one
for x-band and one for fore and aft, so we displayed the fore up and aft
down on the same trace. Years later, the Air Force decided that the twosecond scan was too slow and we had built experimental models of voltage
tuned receiver so that it could be swept much faster. Unfortunately, again,
we lost the… that was the ALR-20, we lost that to Loral who had built the
original tuners and they didn’t sit still.

[0:14:03]

They were gunning for replacing the LM-19 when the time came; this was in
the 1960 time period. The other thing that I did in that time period for this
business was developed a warning receiver for aircraft. The existing warning
receivers only told the pilot or the second-seat operator that there was a

signal didn't tell them what it was. We came up, at that time, I had a couple
of people working, with a receiver that included a processor and we had
matched filters for different threats, so it would display: This is a surface-toair missile, this is an air-to-air missile, and other threats of that type based
on the latest intelligence. About that time, the systems group was split and
the ECM activity was moved to Burlington, Massachusetts.
[0:15:56]

I was offered to go up there, and after looking into it, decided to stay in
Camden. The cost of living was much higher in the Boston area and there
were some other reasons too. The warning receiver activity that we were
working on went to Burlington and one of my key engineers went with it.
Eventually, he wound up flight testing it in Vietnam in the second-seat of an
F4, and it wasn’t too comfortable when the Mig came after him, because
there was civilian on board, they weren’t allowed to engage and had to
return. But the system worked and told them what was coming based on
the radar emissions. One day, I got a call from people in Moorestown that
were working on BMEWS. They said, “We have a problem with BMEWS. It
can be a jammer coming in through the back lobes of the antennae, and we
won't know about it. We need something to detect jammers 360 degrees so
we can take action. But it wasn’t budgeted and we’re in a time bind, so it’s
going to be used indoors, mostly indoors.

[0:18:05]

We could use a commercial equipment.” So I started out with a Polarad
spectrum analyzer, that was our receiver. I got eight directional antennas
and that frequency band of about 400 MHz. Built a switching system so that
you can scan through the antennas and stop, and it worked. It was delivered
to the various sites. Never heard about jamming reports, but they did find
an electric razor in a barracks that was putting out noise, so the system
worked. Another job around that time was from the army security agency,
they came to us. RCA reputation and RCA had high-power hardware. Their
basic question was, this was during the Vietnam war time, “We want to be
able to jam Vietnamese television and we want to be able to substitute our
own programs.

[0:19:58]

We have no idea how to do it, but whatever it is, it’s got to be transportable
in a C-130.” So we didn’t know what was the best way to jam television. We
had a psychologist working for the systems group and he said, “Yeah, I can
devise a test and we’ll go from there.” We wanted to test audio and video,
and he recruited a number of students from Rutgers as the test subjects. For
video jamming, we actually broke it into two pieces. One was attacking the
sync, the other was attacking the video. The sync, we could do in the lab, we
didn’t need any subjective idea. For the video, we came up with a number of
pictures, simple pictures: a car, a horse, a child, a long list. There was also a
list with numbers and check off what you think you see.

[0:21:57]

We ran a number of different jamming wave forms, white noise, and others,
and got the response where the video was no longer intelligible. In parallel,
we were doing tests on the horizontal and vertical sync wave forms, and
they were much more vulnerable than the video. You could tell with a noisy
picture what was there, but if the picture was rolling or horizontal sync lost
and if it’s diagonal lines, there was nothing there to see. Based on energy

needed, the sync was the most vulnerable. We came up with a paper design
for a total system. We didn’t go beyond that but they wound up buying
broadcast transmitters from our broadcast division, and they had to cut
them down to size to fit in the airplane, but that’s what they used. Along the
same lines, we got a call from, I believe it was the navy organization in
Indianapolis, vague recollection. Anyway, the object was we have this
Maverick missile and eventually they built 80,000 of them with many
modifications, different seekers, different boards, and so on.
[0:23:56]

The way the missile operated was you had a command link to the missile,
you had a video link coming back which showed the video to the pilot or the
weapons operator, and they would then use a joystick and move the
camera, which sometimes was visual others IR, and so forth for different
versions, and designate the target, and then direct the missile to hit the
target. In later versions, the missile could be left, once it had acquired the
target, it didn’t need more commands from the launching aircraft. I think
the maximum range was about 50 kilometers. Our task was to study the
existing vulnerability of the command link and the video link, the return link,
and once we had done that, come up with recommendations to improve the
resistance to jamming. In the beginning, I didn’t know it, Advanced
Technology [ATL] was developing a compression system using… Fourier
transforms and digitizing the video.

[0:26:10]

Since we were classified, we didn’t talk to teach other about… it was all for
the Maverick. Anyway, my solution was keep the system simple, keep the
analog video, because based on our tests, it wasn’t really that bad that they
could see them with pretty low signal to noise ratio, but the sync had to be
improved. I recommended that instead of using the conventional horizontalvertical sync, that we use a pseudorandom sequence which would
automatically take care of both horizontal and vertical sync during the
vertical blanking interval that way the sync was protected. That brought us
many Db of anti-jam protection. Got a patent on that sync-protected
system. Don’t know what happened. Hughes was the prime contractor on
the missile, they were also in the communications business and they may
have change the links at some point. That covers the… most of the jamming.

[0:27:59]

When the ECM group moved to Burlington, there was other work being
done and I didn’t go with them, so I merely switched to communications.
But, of course, most of it was anti-jamming communications because I had
the background for jamming and anti-jamming.

[0:28:29] Speaker 1:

That was back here in Camden now?

[0:28:34] Edward:

That was around 1962.

[0:28:36] Speaker 1:

Okay.

[0:28:39] Edward:

Then they moved it to Burlington.

[0:28:41] Speaker 1:

Okay.

[0:28:45] Edward:

Then the first communications job I worked on, it was in progress and pretty
far along but still had some inputs, was called Project Pangloss.

[0:29:07] Speaker 1:

What was that?

[0:29:08] Edward:

Pangloss.

[0:29:09] Speaker 1:

Pangloss.

[0:29:11] Edward:

It was run by the Princeton Labs, but we were building hardware and the
demonstration system, which operated with the VLF system on board
submarines where they had long antennas trailing the submarine. We were
providing very low rate anti-jam protected communication.

[0:29:57]

We used the magnetic drum to store and receive signal and then do the
correlation and finally print out a message at a few bits per second, but they
were highly protected. Then in… it was 1962, we bid on a top secret
communications system that came from the Marine Corp via the Navy. We
won the job. First we had to set up a top secret facility for it. There was a
small building on the roof of 10- building. It was outfitted with an anteroom
where we had an armed guard and where we could have conferences with
people who weren’t cleared top secret, then a top secret are where we had
offices and small conference room, big fancy safe, typewriter ribbons were
locked up every night in the safe since the typewriter ribbons were
classified. The hardware itself was secret and so other people within the
building could build it, but they didn’t know what it was for.

[0:32:04]

They weren’t involved in the operations analysis, that was top secret; in
other words: What’s the threat? What can we do about the threat? And so
forth. Two of my engineers, John Allen and Jim Feller, wrote a secret
Master’s thesis on the hardware for the University of Pennsylvania. It so
happened that their adviser, Dr. Berkowitz, was a consultant for RCA and
had clearance. He worked summers in Moorestown. And so they got their
Master’s degree. Both of them did very well. Jim Feller became Vice
President of… I don’t know what the name of the company was at the time
but it was Martin Marietta at that point. John Allen became staff engineer of
the first division head in Camden and then division head in Moorestown;
unfortunately he died a number of years ago. We had a very good crew.

[0:33:42] Speaker 1:

Can you talk about that a little bit? What about your coworkers? What were
they like?

[0:33:51] Edward:

Well, we had some of the brightest engineers. I was part of hiring Jim Feller,
I interviewed him when he came out of school, University of Michigan, and I
told my boss, “We’ve got to get this guy” and we did; and he did well for
himself and the company. John Allen was also very bright. At that time, we
had [0:34:31 Ron Buskirk who left us but he found one of the papers we
wrote together. A little bit later, Conrad Haber came in. So a lot of the
engineers who worked for me did very well.

[0:34:56] Speaker 1:

Okay.

[0:34:57] Edward:

Now, talking about the top secret program, was called Venus. I won’t go into
any of the technical details; but one time, whenever I traveled with top
secret material, had a briefcase with a chain and handcuff so nobody could
grab it; so one time, I was invited to come down to Norfolk and brief one of
the ship captains about coming technology to counter the threat. It was
organized by an engineer from BuWeps at the time, maybe.

[0:36:00]

Gave a presentation and he was really impressed and he said, “I want the
boss to hear that.” Who was the boss? I don’t remember… Admiral
something or other, head of the Atlantic fleet. So he walks us over to the
other ship and as we approach, all the marines attention and blowing the
whistle and so on.
It came to that point.
Yeah. That was an interesting experience. They had no idea about the threat
and about what we’re trying to do about it. Now, another time I was asked
to give a presentation to NSA. I went to NSA, again with my brief case and
the chain and handcuff. I gave them the presentation and I was 4:00 o’clock
or 4:30, close to quitting time, and I’m ready to leave and they said, “No,
you can’t take top secret material out of this building.“ So how do I get out
of here?” Well, we have to go up the chain and find someone who’s
authorized to sign for top secret material.” Somebody had gone home
already and eventually they found someone who was still there and who
could sign off so the guard would let me out.

[0:38:05]

So that was an interesting experience. I had visions of spending the night
there.

[0:38:12] Speaker 1:

Okay. So that was the 60s…?

[0:38:16] Edward:

62 to 64 era.

[0:38:23] Speaker 1:

After that, you were in the communications group then? Was that…?

[0:38:28] Edward:

Well this was also communications.

[0:38:31] Speaker 1:

Oh okay.

[0:38:32] Edward:

Yeah. Let me see if I have anything else listed in that. Okay, chronologically,
that brings us to the, I mean, there were proposals and other things.

[0:39:14] Speaker 1:

Uh-hmmm. Right.

[0:39:16] Edward:

The in between. In fact, we won a job called Harpy. It was somewhat of a
follow on to our top secret program, but it was a dual award. Magnavox got
one contract and we got the contract. I was working on that and one day, I
bumped into Sam Holt who at the time was… I knew him earlier from DataLink and so on.

[0:40:02]

We were selling transistor radios to the Japanese. Data-Link radios. He said,
“Come to my office. I wanna talk to you.” This was in ’67, after the Apollo
fire, which was January ’67. He said NASA has a problem. Originally the
configuration of the command module and the space module for
rendezvous was that each would carry a rendezvous radar and a
transponder so they could perform ranging from either side. Burlington was
building… Massachusetts, the RCA Burlington, was building the rendezvous
radar. Actually, Sam Holt was the program manager of the RCA portion of
the lunar module electronics. The communications was done in Camden.
The radar was done in Burlington. After, I don’t know whether they
eliminated the second radar, the redundant one, before or after the fire
because it was 80 pounds and that took a lot of booster power. But after the
fire, they insisted they have to have a redundant system of some sort, and
they had mentioned that to Sam Holt in one of his travels to Houston.

[0:41:59]

So he asked me to take a look at it, if there’s any way to use the radios for
ranging, they could get angle measurements with the Sextants. So I started
looking into radios, I asked that measurements be taken of delays, through
various parts of the radios. The delays were horrible. Delay variations from
unit to unit were bad, and most of the delays were in the intermediatefrequency amplifiers and crystal filters were used for selectivity. I came up
with a ranging system that allowed the use of the radios without any
modification but it wasn’t very accurate a thousand feet or whatever. I also
came up with a configuration that was more like a hundred feet but it
required that something had to be done before the IF filters. The RF
amplifiers were wide enough in the radios; but as soon as you got to the IF,
then you were into narrow bandwidth, which meant delay variation, time
variation, range variation.

[0:43:57]

The option was to either turn the local oscillator on and off, which required
some small addition, or put the switch in the pad after the down converter
before the IF and switch the signal with a reference new correlation at that
point, and the resulting error signal would be low enough to pass through
the intermediate-frequency amplifiers. We said, “Okay, let’s put a
presentation together. Let’s go on down to Houston and give them the
options.” Making changes to the radios meant radios that had already been
shipped had to be brought back. It was when the moon landing was in ’69,
some of the earth’s orbits and rendezvous, and so it were earlier in ’68, so
we’re talking in ’67 the radios were already being installed or in place. We
went down to the room, in Houston, and had a room full of people, and the
spokesman was Frank Borman . He was tasked with the ranging and the
rendezvous problem. I gave the presentation and it didn’t take long he said,
“I want a more accurate system. And how soon can you start?” And I think
within a week we had authorization to spend up to a million or whatever
until we could come up with a cost estimate… I mean, they were in a time
bind. That’s how we started with the program. The technical issue was… I
may have lots of material that I can show you, I can leave some with you.
The technical concept was that we had a reference signal which was sent… a
ranging signal that was sent by the transmitter at the command module. The
transmitter was wide band so it didn’t distort the signal. The voice at that
time was pulse-width modulation so the transmitter was on and off. It

wasn’t conventional amplitude modulation, to get the most efficiency out of
the transistors. The pulse-width modulation started with a sawtooth. It was
added to the voice and then clipped and you have a pulse-width modulated
signal.
[0:48:00]

It turned out we couldn’t really use the pulse-width modulated signal; there
was too much variation to get a good ranging signal. So we changed the
frequency slightly to make the numbers come out. In those days, number
conversions from one set to have things come out in hundreds of a nautical
mile or so. Easiest thing was pick the right frequency. We used, I think it was
31.6 kHz square wave as the ranging signal. The technology that made it
work was to do a correlation in the receiver and the wide band portion of
the receiver, which was right after the mixer, before the signal went to the
intermediate amplifier. So we were applying a reference signal to a switch
with an early reference and a late reference. The switching rate between
early and late was low enough by 5 kHz so it would go through the IF. It was
an error signal now, it was not , no more, the actual ranging signal. The
whole system used three tones.

[0:50:00]

One of the tone was in the, I think by 3.9 kHz, that’s well within the audio
range. The second tone was 247 Hz to get unambiguous range but the other
amplifiers weren’t designed to handle that low frequency so I combined it
with the middle tone, modulo 2 addition. So we had the low tone
information there but it was still subcarrier, so it passed through the narrow
band part.

[0:50:52] Speaker 1:

What kind of accuracy did that give you?

[0:50:55] Edward:

In the end, we wound up with a hundred feet rms.

[0:50:58] Speaker 1:

Wow. Okay.

[0:51:00] Edward:

And we had… we were talking about it but I don’t think it was ever done. We
measured every radio for delays through different portions of the radio. We
could’ve done a little bit better by individually calibrating each radio or do a
computer correction or something. The only problem was in those days, this
was in the ‘60s, computers done by MIT and the programs and the memory
were stored in cores and they were threaded, they weren’t programmed,
they were actually physically threaded with the program, so making a
program change was a big deal.

[0:52:05]

The computing power was such that it wasn’t practical to make corrections.
We picked frequencies that gave us the right nautical miles, in fact,
hundreds of nautical miles. There was no conversion required.

[0:52:30] Speaker 1:

We had heard that the system worked so well that it actually became
preferred to the rendezvous radar. Is that correct?

[0:52:42] Edward:

Yes, we had multiple modes. We had the acquisition mode and we had the
operating mode. During the operating mode, we could handle voice at the
same time, but it was clipped speech. It was not pulse-width modulated. We

also had the third mode which was voice only, which was pulse-width
modulation. Intelligibility was a little bit better than a clipped speech, but
the next… after Apollo 17, the next NASA mission, where the system was
used, was Skylab and it did not have a radar transponder, it only had the
VHF ranging system.
[0:53:52] Speaker 1:

That’s pretty impressive.

[0:53:54] Edward:

And it worked for all the Skylab missions.

[0:53:57]

And then when NASA started talking with the Russians about doing a
rendezvous with the Soyuz, They decided that the lightest and cheapest way
to do it was to use the VHF ranging system and have the lunar module
transceivers and the processor, which was called the range tone transfer
assembly, not my choice. But it described what it did. The way it worked was
that it actively tracked the fine tone, which was the… actually, the range
determining signal, it turned around to lower frequencies. There was no
processing of those. Delay variations were acceptable to just turn them
around and accept…

[0:55:14] Speaker 1:

So that system was actually…

[0:55:16] Edward:

We had to tweak it a little bit once we got all the measurement numbers.

[0:55:22] Speaker 1:

Did you have anything to do with the Apollo 13 incident?

[0:55:27] Edward:

I was at the Cape watching the launch.

[0:55:30] Speaker 1:

Wow.

[0:55:32] Edward:

Walked away from there and drove away from the launch area and… Geeh!
That was a nice launch. I’ve got pictures of it. Then later on in the radio, I
heard that something went wrong but the crew was still all right.

[0:55:59]

I'll tell you a few experiences during the Apollo program. Of course, I went
to Houston many times, went to Cape Kennedy many times, went to the top
of the vehicle assembly building and actually tapped on the command
module that was…

[0:56:24] Speaker 1:

Wow.

[0:56:25] Edward:

You’d look down and people were about this big. Walked under the crawler.
Huge thing with tons of tons stuff sitting on top of it. I was involved in the
flight testing of the system. It was tested at White Sands on an airplane. Got
great results there. Though it didn’t go on the early flights because it wasn’t
ready, even though we got flight hardware in 14 months, which was
unheard of, but you know: All stops were out. Whatever people you needed,
overtime you needed, get it built, get it to work, get it installed.

[0:57:42] Speaker 1:

So through all of this, how did you feel that the RCA management looked on
your work?

[0:57:54] Edward:

I was awarded the Sarnoff award for outstanding engineering.

[0:57:56] Speaker:

Oh wow!

[0:57:57] Edward:

for the VHF ranging system. I have pictures of Borman visiting the plant,
looking at the equipment. It was a great time.

[0:58:21] Speaker 1:

How did your supervisors treat you?

[0:58:31] Edward:

Very well. Unfortunately, the best supervisor I had left RCA just about the
time that we got started on the VHF ranging program. Because I was
working on the Navy communications program called Harpy, which was a
spread-spectrum system. And he was involved with Dr. Pritchard at Fort
Monmouth.

[0:59:26] Speaker 1:

What was his name?

[0:59:27] Edward:

He was at RCA at one time…

[0:59:30] Speaker 1:

Your supervisor?

[0:59:31] Edward:

Bert Glaser. And he left just about… He may have written up the
recommendation. I was one of the people involved in it for the Sarnoff
award. He went on to Magnavox, became the vice president there. They
were…

[1:00:05] Speaker 1:

You had quite a career at RCA. How would you sum up RCA? What was it like
to you?

[1:00:25] Edward:

RCA was in the forefront of technology. I think they went downhill when
they got into the carpets and banquet foods and other things that had
nothing to do with the core technology. I guess they owned CIT for a while.

[1:00:53] Speaker 1:

So you’ve…

[1:00:55] Edward:

I’ll get to some other topics where I was very disappointed.

[1:01:00] Speaker 1:

Okay. What would you say was the best thing about working for RCA?

[1:01:13] Edward:

I think the opportunities of working on great technology.

[1:01:27] Speaker 1:

What about the worst thing?

[1:01:32] Edward:

The worst thing was that they were not interested in pursuing small things. I
can talk about that now…

[1:01:53] Speaker 1:

Okay.

[1:01:54] Edward:

Their… we can talk about another NASA program and then go to spinoffs
from VHF ranging system.

[1:02:10] Speaker 1:

Okay.

[1:02:16] Edward:

NASA was coming out with a number of RFQs for experiments, which were
done on the later missions. We bid on one that Raytheon had worked on
before and they obviously won it. But then there was a second one,
technology program, which was called the Lunar Sounder and, again, Sam
Holt said, “This is a tough job,” and he’s spoken to NASA and they feel we
can do it. So the Lunar Sounder went on Apollo 17. It was installed on the
command module, service module, and it was a side-looking radar, coherent
synthetic aperture radar, which mapped the moon. the command module
was circling the moon while all the other stuff was going on the surface of
the moon.

[1:03:59]

The unit transmitted on three frequencies: 5MHz, 15MHz, and 150 MHz.
And the low frequencies were designed to penetrate down to several
kilometers below the surface of the moon. They were looking for water,
which wasn’t there. But they found things at 1.4 km. Different plates and
surfaces and so on. The higher frequency, at 150 MHz, was mostly intended
for surface features. I’ve seen some IEEE articles where they compared
optical pictures with cameras and the radar images, and the advantages of
the radar images was there were no shadows, while using the sun's
illumination, you had shadows. Okay, so what was the problem with the
Lunar Sounder? The transmitter was straightforward and the receiver was
straightforward, except for one parameter. The system consisted of the
radar, a set of antennas, and a film recorder which had a 10-hour capacity; it
was made by Goodyear in Arizona, Phoenix.

[1:06:01]

And digital technology couldn’t record that kind of information, even tapes
were too bulky. Film was the only medium that could handle all the data
that was coming back, and the film recorder was brought back. Initially, it
was processed at the university of Michigan where they used optical
processing, optical correlators. I went up there and they showed me
reconnaissance pictures from high altitude and you could see… you could
almost read the street signs. And they said, “We can’t show you the really
classified stuff.” Anyway, the RFQ went to Camden because we were in the
space business. It went to Moorestown because they were involved in the…
they had done antennas for the Apollo program and also for the Lunar
Rover, this umbrella type antenna. They decided that the spec was
impossible to meet. It required a -65 dB side lobe level with cosine
weighting. And they said, “Any of the pulse compression we’ve done ends
about 40 dB because that’s the limit of pulse compression delay lines, which
was state of the art.”

[1:08:13] Speaker 1:

Did Camden decide to bid on it?

[1:08:18] Edward:

Camden asked me, “You think you can meet the requirement?” I said, “Well,
I’m not sure, but the first problem is we’ve got to have a way to measure it.”
And my original proposal was to build a sweep circuit which did the
frequency modulation of the radar, sweeping it, which was corrected over a
number of points to make sure it was linear over the range. The next issue

was, “How do you test it?” I came up with a technique where you use the
signal and correlated against itself and, if there’re any distortions, they
would show up. And how do you correlate the signal against itself? You put
in a delay of one signal and you must take the output of the transmitter and
then in a test set, use the same signal to delay it and look at the difference
and you can look at it on the scope, and I have pictures that show it.
[1:10:07]

Our management was kind of hesitant, but we had an approach. I said, “You
know. Let’s see if we can borrow a radar engineer with pulse compression
background.” And we’ve got… There were just a few people in Moorestown
that had extensive pulse compression experience and we’ve got one of
them, and he helped with the proposal. A radar book had just come out the
part of pulse compression radar was written by George Stevens in
Moorestown. So we had access to it. So right people who had background in
pulse compression…

[1:11:16] Speaker 1:

Did we win that bid?

[1:11:18] Edward:

We won the bid. As we started to work the problem, and we had a test
method, it turned out we could build the sweep that was linear enough that
we didn’t have to use the corrections. Originally, the film was processed by
the University of Michigan.

[1:11:57]

Then as the digital technology improved. It was Jet Propulsion Lab. We
started to use digital processing, and that allowed them to measure side
lobes and correct for the side lobes. The side lobe problem was just when
you’re looking to the surface of the moon and then down below, you get a
lot of reflections from areas you’re not looking for, like the surface. So if the
side lobes are high, you’re going to get a lot of returns from the wrong
levels. So that flew on Apollo 17, it was very successful. There’s such a
database, they still haven’t processed it all.

[1:13:09] Speaker 1:

After that, you…?

[1:13:12] Edward:

Interesting aside, a few months ago, I got an email from a guy name Reese
Morgan. It didn’t ring a bell. It said, “Are you the Ed Nossen who worked on
the Lunar Sounder? The CESAR I sent an email back and said, “Yes, I worked
on it.” Gave him a little bit of a background that the radar people didn’t
want to touch it and I was hoping to take a chance.

[1:13:57]

We chatted back and forth and finally he said, “Okay. Here’s the story. My
father worked with you at Rockwell, they were doing the command module.
And in his diary he mentioned you many times.” And also when the program
was over and Rockwell had a family store, there was serial number 1 of the
CESAR and they were taking bids from employees, he put in a bid of $500
and he got serial number 1. And he said after his father passed away, he
inherited a lot of space goodies he said that was one of them. He wants to
interview me too.

[1:15:16] Speaker 1:

Over your career you developed about 35 patents.

[1:15:22] Edward:

Right.

[1:15:25] Speaker:

It would make you one of the superstars at RCA.

[1:15:29] Edward:

I got a bunch of plaques. Interesting thing was RCA didn’t want to file a
patent for the VHF ranging system. They told me there was a conflict,
someone in NASA claimed “Oh yeah! I come up with that same idea.”

[1:16:02]

And they said, “Okay. Keep our hands off this.” Once the Apollo program
was over, what other business is there? So the patent department decided
not to do anything, which is okay because I got them to file later on different
versions of it.

[1:16:28] Speaker 1:

Oh okay.

[1:16:30] Edward:

One of the things, I don’t think I mentioned that, when I built the noise filter
for the servo system, I had wide bandwidth for large error signals and a
narrow bandwidth for small error signals, I put in a patent disclosure. The
patent department said, “Nah, we’re not going to file.” They weren’t keen
on filing for defense inventions; they were looking for commercial at the
time. Later on they changed their mind. But the interesting thing was Dolby
came out with the noise reduction system. I read the Dolby patent and said,
“Geeh! Sounds like mine.” Told the patent department, “Hey! I was there
first.” And they checked with Indianapolis where they were building stereo
systems and so on for commercial use and they said, “Well, at the moment
they’re not paying Dolby labs.

[1:17:58]

But if it comes to that, we’ll bring it up and say ‘Hey, maybe your patent isn't
valid because they had published it as a technote, not as a patent.’” I think
the difference between not paying Dolby, and they could’ve collected from
Dolby and others, it’s a big difference if it had been. There was another
situation where I came up with an idea, I don’t remember exactly which it
was, but they didn’t file. And about seven years later, I came across the
application and told them “You know, I still think that’s a good idea. Why
don’t you file them?” and they said, “Okay. We’ll file it.” And guess what?
IBM had filed similar thing during the period that they were holding off.

[1:19:25] Speaker 1:

As far as wrapping this up, how would you describe your experience? Your
employment at RCA? Certainly, you had more than just a job here.

[1:19:39] Edward:

Oh yeah. Well I have many more things I’d like to talk about. First of all, the
Apollo ranging system, everybody acknowledged that, “Hey, it was an
interesting technology and is there an application elsewhere for it?” So the
Apollo program, the radios were full-duplex radios and most of the military
radios, tactical radios and so on, were half-duplex. You talk and you listen.
We went looking for an application about the Apollo system and talking with
Air Force and other services. We came across a serious problem that they’ve
had in Vietnam. When a pilot was down, he had a survival radio. It was a
radio with a couple of fixed frequencies and a beacon. You could turn the
beacon on, come find me. Well, very often, the enemy got there first. So
what they were looking for was something that’s secure. That doesn’t send

out a signal and keep it up. It was the same as the beacons they put on
airplanes.
[1:21:57]

An airplane went down and it was on land and the beacon would go off. I
started thinking about, first of all, the half-duplex issue. You transmit a signal
and some time later, that signal arrives and the timing depends on how
stable the oscillators are, time references, how you’re searching with an
airplane, it’s moving. We needed some technology that was different from
conventional analog trying too loose, and so on. ATL had come up with a
synthesizer, which we called the arithmetic synthesizer. In fact, Jay Butler
got a patent on it. It basically was… you added a number and it was an
increasing number, so we had essentially created a sweep and you could
count up, count down, generate a signal, and the stability was based strictly
on the clock that drove it.

[1:24:08]

With that, it was possible to remember frequency, time, and if you had…
they have great information. They could even include that if it was the
result of airplane motion, and so forth. We finally had a system that looked
like it would work and we convinced the Air Force at Wright Field that they
would go out and procure a demonstration system. We got the RFQ and
RCA, the marketing, and others looked at it and they decided, “Nah, we
don’t want to be in that business. We’re not going to bid.” I was pretty
upset. We got in touch with Cubic, San Diego. They had done some search
equipment for downed airmen, but they were just looking for a signal and
direction.

[1:26:04]

They had, obviously, had no range. But we teamed up with them and got our
management to agree to go along as a subcontractor. We won the job, the
team won the job. We built the airborne interrogator, which was looked like
three circuit board set fit into the Cubic equipment, and we built a very
small transponder module which had the tracking circuits and all of those
things. We did some other things. For security reasons, we used
pseudorandom sequences which had a period equivalent to the 247 Hz low
frequency tone, but now it was the duration of its sequence, so that gave us
several hundred miles of unambiguous range. Since the radio that was being
built and targeted for this was the PRC 112; at the time, it was built by
Motorola. They introduced the correlation circuitry in the radio and we
would drive that.

[1:27:59]

We also made another change, since these were really low powered radios,
we didn’t want to use an on-off type modulation. So we switched to phase
modulation. I mean it had the amplitude modulation for normal voice but
for our application, we used the combination in it: amplitude and phase
modulation; and it made it more efficient. Instead of being an afterthought
like the Apollo program now, it was designed from the start. We built the
little modules and in ’92, no… ’82 we ran tests with the Motorola radios and
we also tested with Tadiran radios. Tadiran was also in the search and
rescue business. It worked successfully with the Tadiran radio and with the
Motorola radio. Since then, the PRC 112 went through iterations from A to G
since the original module was built in ’82 with custom LSI chips done in
Summerville.

[1:30:03]

Well, the technology wasn’t available anymore and they were forced to
switch to all software implemented modules. Along the way, they added
GPS and there were like 31,000 of them built and RCA walked away from it.
I have pictures of our module, Tadiran module, sitting in a Tadiran radio. I
believe that they were still getting the chips from RCA until that was over.
The services came out with a new rescue survival radio. By the way, every
astronaut carried a PRC 112 because if the mission was aborted early
enough, they could parachute out and wind up at a down range in the ocean
and they used those. In fact, I have an article where they simulated the
search and rescue of astronauts 40 miles of the mainland. The follow on
system was… the Motorola sold their division to General Dynamics and they
built the ones with the processor controlled option.

[1:32:05]

But it was the same DME waveform that we had used earlier. The follow on
radio was built by Boeing and it had all kinds of bells and whistles. Since it
had GPS, they were suggesting, or someone said, “Gee, we don’t need that
DME function anymore.” And the Military said, “Now wait a minute. What if
GPS is not available? What if it’s denied? Jammed? Whatever. We want to
keep it in there.” So at this point, there are over 80,000 radios that have that
function in it.

[1:32:57] Speaker 1:

Wow. It’s amazing. We got, I think… Why don’t we take a little break?

[1:33:06] Edward:

Let me just mention one thing. I did get a patent on the rescue radio version
the half-duplex with the phase modulation and so on. I also found out that
there is a company which has offices in this country and sells or leases
equipment which uses a system developed by Tadiran for the rescue of
downed pilots; it’s what it says in their opening statement on the literature.
Well, Tadiran got the technology from us.

[1:33:57] Speaker 1:

From us?

[1:34:00] Edward:

What they used it for was to keep track of people, cars, boats, and so on.
Again, some place where GPS might not work. They claim to have lots of
users.

[1:34:25] Speaker 1:

I imagine. Yeah.

[1:34:30] Edward:

And they apparently installed… it’s a competing system to LoJack. And
they’ve installed a number of towers to cover a given area.

[1:34:46] Speaker 1:

All on that one invention.

[1:34:51] Edward:

And RCA dropped the ball.

[1:34:57] Speaker 1:

Okay, Ed, while we are going to pick up this interview when you were telling
us about the post Apollo things.

[1:35:09] Edward:

Right. In the early ‘70s, which was obviously after the Apollo program was
over, we worked with the group in Moorestown called Seer systems

engineering group, and they had gotten a contract to study remotely piloted
vehicles.
[1:35:52]

In Camden, we studied the communications requirements and configured a
communications system to handle a large number of such vehicles that were
involved in performing reconnaissance, which meant high data rates, and we
had an IR&D program and we built an breadboard system working at SHF.
The antenna group in Moorestown developed a phased array that would fit
on a remotely piloted vehicle so that it could act as an airborne satellite
repeater so that many RPVs could send signals to it and it would send it to a
control center. As a result of the IR&D work we did, we got a contract, one
of two contracts, with the Air Force Wright-Patterson. The other company
was Sperry in Salt Lake City. We came up with a detailed design and we
wrote a specification for hardware development, so did the other
contractor, and there would be a down selection to a single contractor to go
ahead with hardware development.

[1:38:00]

Through various sources, I won’t say how, we found out that it essentially
was our specification that would’ve been put out on the street.
Unfortunately, The Pentagon withdrew the money and we learned that the
pilots were against it at the time. They didn’t like unmanned vehicles
because they would lose their flight pay. The interesting thing is we applied
for spectrum for this system. Years later, we were notified that our request
for a spectrum in the SHF band had been granted, although the program
didn’t go anywhere at the time. We were ahead of our time, I guess, as far
as RPVs went and name changed over the years but now the drones,
unmanned vehicles and so forth. Going ahead to 1977, especially October,
or leading up to that, was a very busy time for me. It turned out I had six
conference papers with my name on it.

[1:39:48] Speaker 1:

Wow.

[1:39:54] Edward:

I couldn’t even go to one of the conferences. Conrad Haber reminded me
that I send him.

[1:40:03]

He was one of the co-authors. It was his first time at a conference as a
speaker, but he got the experience.

[1:40:15] Speaker 1:

Yeah, he mentioned that that was quite a traumatic experience for him.

[1:40:23] Edward:

The reason there were so many was that Robert Dixon, who wrote a book
on spread-spectrum, he was an acquaintance I met at a conferences and
other places, he called me one day and he said, “I’m running this conference
and the papers are very slow in coming in, do you have any?” And I said,
“Well, I have something but I can send you some abstracts for other things
that I could write about.” I sent them in and he called back and said, “I’ll
take all three.” One of them was about the Apollo VHF ranging so I had all
the material there. But the other interesting thing that happened, around
the same time, the government of Israel invited RCA to send several
representatives to Israel and they would be chauffeured around for a week
and visit many companies and also military establishments.

[1:41:54]

I was selected to represent the communications division. Wendell Anderson
was the other and the third was Bob Trachtenberg, and they represented
advance technology M&SR. I decided to combine it with a sightseeing trip as
it this was first time. I took my wife, we flew to Paris where she had relatives
and she stayed there. I flew on to Israel. We were driven around, spoke to
CEOs at different companies like Tadiran, Elbit, Raphael government
organization and others. We had slides of a lot of the unclassified material
we could show. We met with some of the intelligence people, showed them
what we had. With the Air Force, on one evening, we met with an Air Force
General and his staff. After three hours or so of presentations and talking,
he finally said, “Thank you very much, but don’t tell any Israeli company how
much time you’ve got, because I gave you a lot more time than I give to
locals.”

[1:43:57]

After we were done with the business, my wife came over and then we took
a tour with a tour bus that took us all over Israel and it was a worthwhile
trip. As it turned out, also for business. For instance, at Elbit, which is a
computer company, I asked them, “Where are your costumers?” And then
they had a whole bunch of names including Egypt, Saudi Arabia… I thought
there was a ban on exporting to Arab countries. Well we don’t show
anything in Hebrew and we send it through a third party country and
everybody is happy. RCA was building equipment, RCA was also blacklisted
after the ’73 war. In Burlington, they were building emergency landing
facilities, shelters with equipment, and so on. They could not show RCA on
there when they shipped it to an Arab country, just a US government
number. After the trip to Israel, where…

[1:46:01]

By the way, I also was met with the Tadiran people which figured in the
survival radio business. We got a request for proposal from the Israeli
government for development and installation of a large surveillance system
involving airborne and ground facilities and ground-to-ground connections
and so forth. We won the job, which was in the hundreds of millions. We set
up a separate facility for two reasons, in the East Gate on Gaithers Drive, we
had Israeli engineers coming over to participate in the development and
also, for security reasons, was kept separate. The hardware was built in
Camden, but all system work and customer interactions were done in East
Gate.

[1:47:57]

I was responsible for the communication and support system, both ground
based and airborne. I had an Israeli subcontractor. We provided stable
platform for the airborne segment and had uplinks, downlinks and so forth
and then ground links to pass the information to central site. I made a
number of trips to Israel to interface with my subcontract there. We had a
problem with the stabilization system. We used a Singer gyro stabilized
system and they were scaling it from another application and it turned out it
didn’t scale that well. There was a lot of investigation and finally, I decided
to take a look at it, and my conclusion, “You need more gain for the Gyro
system signals to make this bring it up out of the noise.” At that time, I was
pulled off the program.

[1:50:02]

Most of the stuff had already been built. I was put on the mobile ICBM
program that we had just the won from Boeing. We were just in the concept
phase coming up with different options. We were looking at things that
were really new to us like meteor burst communication, near vertical
incidence, HF communication. In addition to frequency hopping for
protection, we started a HF modem for a near vertical incidence
communication. Then it turned out when RFQ came out, I don’t remember
exactly the agency, but we won the job. We built the modem… I had
configured and we had two options, 64 alphabet modem with either FSK or
CSK code division…

[1:52:01]

Pseudo-noise. We tested that successfully, outfitted a truck with, a small
truck, with the necessary test equipment and the modem and the HF radio,
and drove to different locations. One time I was in the RCA office in
Washington and our marketing guy brought in his counterpart from Harris.
Harris was always our arch competitor in the satellite business and so on.
We were talking and finally he said, “How did you win that modem job?” I
said, “Well, we had some good technology, some good ideas.” He said, “We
wrote the specs for it. We were supposed to get it.” I said, “What? We
probably had better ideas.” I did a lot of commuting to Seattle, to Boeing,
during the mobile ICBM job. We had just signed a contract for full-scale
development.

[1:53:55]

It was over $100 million and we were rejoicing indeed, won another big one,
and then the Berlin wall fell, and contract was canceled immediately. Okay…
We’re in a different phase now. When we had the contract with the
government of Israel, like I said we went to Israel. In fact, our first major
design review was held in the Tel Aviv Hilton Hotel for two weeks. They
cleared the floor, swept it for bugs, brought in files for secret documents,
posted guards, and we slept on a different floor, ate on a different floor, and
had our business there. It turned out to be successful. I was looking out of
my hotel window in the morning and I saw all these windsurfers on the
Mediterranean. Finally, I just said, “I got to try that.” I was a sailor, I had a
small boat, but my brother had a bigger one. I went out there when we had
an afternoon off and started on the simulator.

[1:55:56]

Once I got back to the United States, I took it up seriously and I owned a
couple of boards. After the ICBM program was canceled, I went back to
business as normal. We heard about a procurement from ESD for a portable
SHF satellite terminal, really portable like carried in a backpack. There was
an article by Mitre in Milcom ‘89 or so and I looked at it and it described the
protocol and it’s not going to work. So we went up to Mitre and talked
about it. We really didn't have much to offer, this was like January of ’90. I
was just rereading a report that said we went back in April and I gave the
presentation. I had a fully fleshed out system with protocol and they were
amazed, it came from nowhere.

[1:58:00]

In three months, what turned out to be very similar to what they had done
in-house, they realized that the one they published before was unworkable.
There was no throughput. So we had all our view graphs marked the
"company private" and so on, and they were wondering why we did that

and we mentioned, “Well, we might want to file for a patent.” They were a
little bit sensitive but they were sure that nothing had leaked, that we had
come up with independently. After we began, we won an award and Harris
won an award. We each built a terminal and it used the reset concept
where you have small terminals communicating through a satellite and then
there's a very large control terminal so you get a lot of power going through
the satellite to the small antennas, and by the same token, small amount of
power goes up to the satellite, received by this big control terminal.
[2:00:13]

The program was very successful. It was tested in a number of places. This
was the time when I officially retired and so I didn’t stay that close to it. But
the most interesting part was after the US tests were done, they wanted to
include the United Kingdom, and both the Harrison and the GE unit went
over there, and we tested first, from what I heard, automatically acquired…
entered satellite coordinates or so and found the satellite, acquired it,
tracked it, communicated, and Harris couldn’t acquire the satellite. And they
said, “Can you tell us where it is?” That’s about the story. I have a… Oh it
turned out that there is the datasheet on it. Interesting thing is I found two
datasheets. One is marked GE Aerospace and the other one is marked
Martin Marietta.

[2:01:58] Speaker 1:

Right, during the transition.

[2:02:00] Edward:

That was the period when this was completed and tested. Here’s a picture
of units… and units in the field. I found a conference paper written by the
project engineer at the… yeah, it was a military guy… he commented that
the RCA unit had much lower side lobes and therefore was better suited for
low probability of intercept. I don't know what happened after that as far as
procurement. And of course, I got a patent on the protocol system design.
That was like my last effort at…

[2:03:41] Speaker 1:

All 35 patents, right?

[2:03:44] Edward:

Yes.

[2:03:44] Speaker 1:

That's pretty remarkable.

[2:03:47] Edward:

I have to tell you a story about one patent.

[2:03:51]

I came up with a design, tell you in a moment what it was, and sent a
disclosure in to the patent department and they decided to file it. And the
question that came back, “How come you are disclosing something that's
not in your area of business?” You know, military electronics or something. I
told them, “Well, one of my hobbies since I was in system engineering, I still
liked to dabble in circuit technology, designing circuits, and playing with
transistors, whatever, ICs…” and I had always an interest in test equipment
since I've worked in television repair early on, and so I found a connection in
Harrison where they built the RCA test equipment and they had equipment
that was out and came back because the case was damaged or something,
they couldn’t sell it, and they would make it available to employees at half of
manufacturing cost.

[2:05:59]

So I got tempted and one of the first units I bought was the Solid State
Master Voltohmist Big Meter. I used it for various purposes and I got
disgusted with it. I didn’t like the way the controls worked. I mean, switch
from positive to negative; if the meter was up, then the needle would go
down; so I used the systems engineering approach, “Okay here's what I want
to achieve. Here's what it's doing now and how can I get around it?” I came
up with a circuit modification including using an op-amp and modified the
circuit board, and it worked like a charm. That’s it. Let’s say it’s admiral. By
that time of course, RCA was going out of the test equipment business.
Discussions with several of our attorneys, patent attorneys, said “It doesn’t
matter. We make deals. A hundred patents of ours versus a hundred patents
of IBM. It’s a package deal.” So the more we have, the better off.

[2:07:46] Speaker 1:

Interesting.

[2:07:47] Edward:

It issued.

[2:07:52] Speaker 1:

Yeah. That certainly is a remarkable career that you’ve had. As I mentioned,
several of our… other people that we interviewed had mentioned you as a
mentor or a contributor or something that advanced the electronics or
advanced the Science.

[2:08:23] Edward:

Oh again, there’s one thing. We spoke about frequency hopping briefly. As
part of the RPV program, we had done it for SHF. One of the products that
RCA made for years in Cambridge, Ohio were Manpack radios and the POC77, I think it was. The Army was ready to go out for a new generation under
a program called the SINGARS and they wanted AJ protection. So we built a
couple of models with our design and in fact I remember we gave a paper at
the classified conference and actually demonstrated the radio’s acquisition
of codes and communication and so forth. We thought we were way ahead
of the industry.

[2:09:56]

When the procurement came out, RCA didn’t want to bid. One of the
stipulations in the procurement was that they wanted NATO participation.
Instead of not bidding, it was decided to team up with the British company,
Racal. So they came over here and we wrote the proposal, and we lost. We
went to the debriefing, there was a lot of gobbledygook. Not a clear story.
Years later, I met one of the guys who was on the evaluation board or so,
and we were talking, he said, “Off the records, you guys won the technical
competition hands down, but our management did not want to deal with a
foreign prime contractor. If you had bid prime with them, so you would’ve
won.” So it was a consolation that the technical aspects were way up there.

[2:11:47] Speaker 1:

Yeah and that seems to be a very common story with RCA so…

[2:11:55] Edward:

They didn’t want to bid on other programs where we had really set the stage
for it.

[END OF TRANSCRIPT]

